







Receivership in Lawrence, MA: Problems, Possibilities, and Progress 




Massachusetts is this country’s top-performing state.  According to the 2012 PISA results, if 
Massachusetts were separated from the United States, it would place ninth in math proficiency and 
fourth in reading proficiency in the world (Crotty, 2014). 
 
Such success, however, has eluded schools in many of Massachusetts’s post-industrial towns such 
as Lawrence. In 2010, students in Lawrence Public Schools (LPS) ranked in the bottom one percent 
on the state’s annual tests; the district’s proficiency rates averaged 28 and 29 percentages points 
lower than the state’s on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) in Math 
and English Language Arts (ELA), respectively.1 The district’s underperformance had been 
chronic: in 2010 student achievement was declining in three-quarters of the twenty-eight schools, 
and graduation rates hovered at 31 percentage points below the state’s average. Almost a quarter 
of ninth graders failed to move to the 10th grade (LPS Turnaround Plan, 2012).  
 
The tipping point came in 2010 when the district’s superintendent was indicted for corruption, and 
the district’s financial disarray became public (Stergio, 2010). After reviewing the records, state 
education commissioner Mitchell Chester placed the Lawrence school district in receivership and 
appointed Jeffrey Riley as receiver (New York Times, 2015). Under the receivership, the entire 
governing capacity of the district rested upon Riley and his position.  
 
Portfolio Management Models 
When state departments of education intervene in low-performing districts, they usually adopt 
variations of the portfolio management model (PMM) (Schueler et al., 2016). Louisiana and 
Tennessee, for instance, used the PMM in New Orleans and Memphis. In both cases, the state 
decoupled the district from geographic boundaries and recruited charter operators to turn around 
low-performing schools. The role of charter operators differed: New Orleans became a 
comprehensive charter system in which most of the district’s schools had been started ex nihilo, 
whereas Memphis used charter management organizations to turn around low-performing schools, 
not to build new school cultures from the ground up. Tennessee thus relied upon the existing public 
school system to a much greater degree than had Louisiana (Kim et al., 2015; Glazer et al., 2015).  
 
How have students fared under these two interventions? The evidence from New Orleans suggests 
some positive gains against a very low starting point; despite increasing their End of Course Index 
                                                          





(EOC)2 scores by 34 percentage points between 2009 and 2014, New Orleans’ students still ranked 
near the bottom in the state (Sims & Rossmeier, 2015).  The evidence from Tennessee is slimmer 
still: while overall results in targeted schools improved, many effects remained statistically 
insignificant (Zimmer et al., 2015).  The lack of uplift may be due to the relative newness of the 
Tennessee intervention, now in its 4th year of implementation, not to the robustness of the 
intervention per se. 
 
How transportable are these two examples to other contexts? This is unclear. While urban school 
districts share common challenges such as high levels of poverty, racial tensions, and low student 
achievement, the governance appropriate to each context is unique (Malkus & English, 2015). 
Certainly, the devastation of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 offered not only the possibility, but also 
the necessity, of re-thinking New Orleans’s school system from the ground up. The Massachusetts 
model suggests another way forward. 
 
The Massachusetts Receivership 
In a 2015 Politico article, Jeffrey Riley suggested that Lawrence’s approach to turnaround school 
reform represented “a third way of doing business” (Bakeman, 2015). He likened the receivership 
to an architectural plan in which the district established common standards, while school leaders 
were given flexibility to fit those standards to their students’ needs – a rejection of the one-size-
fits-all structure that had been in place in Lawrence previously (LPS Turnaround and Architecture 
Model, 2015).  
 
Massachusetts had granted Riley broad powers, including the authority to “charterize” the LPS if 
he deemed it necessary. The dynamics of the district were such that Riley and his team adopted 
their own hybrid portfolio model, while still relying on lessons learned from other states (Stergio, 
2015). For instance, they brought two well-established charter operators into the district - 
Community Day and UP Education Network – to serve as contractors rather than as independent 
operators. These operators provided instructional support and managerial expertise for low-
performing schools (Vasniz, 2012).  
 
Additionally, Riley designed the receivership so that central control would diminish as schools 
improved. For example, because of its proven history, UP Education Network was given autonomy 
in staffing, scheduling, and choosing curricula in UP Leonard, a turnaround school. By contrast, 
Tarbox Elementary, a Level 3 school with declining scores prior to the state receivership, received 
ongoing central office support and oversight. 
 
Critically, Riley abrogated components of the collective bargaining agreement that he deemed 
deleterious to student learning. He added performance-based teacher compensation, a longer 
school day and year, robust teacher and principal evaluation protocols, and school leaders’ capacity 




The receivership faced numerous challenges. LPS had been characterized by a culture of low 
                                                          




expectations. School leadership and staff had become habituated to persistently low student 
achievement. LPS also includes a large Hispanic student population of which 80% were learning 
English as a second language. The teachers union resisted change; many parents felt 
disenfranchised; the larger Lawrence community itself had grown pessimistic in the face of the 
school system’s fiscal irresponsibility and lackluster results. A final challenge was budgetary: 
Riley and his team faced financial constraints that were remedied only slightly under RTTT 
funding. Given these factors, Riley’s priority was to build a community ethos around education 
based on high expectations and hope.  
 
Strategic Plan  
In May 2012 Riley presented a district turnaround plan that he characterized as a transformative 
partnership between teachers, administrators, and parents (Riley & Chester, 2012; LPS 
Turnaround Plan, 2012). The plan set out four strategies for turning LPS into a high-performing 
system of schools: (1) using data for ongoing formative assessments; (2) establishing a high-
quality cohort of teachers and staff; (3) increasing student supports such as social-emotional 
interventions, targeted academic needs, and special education; and (4) creating systems that 
developed school autonomy side by side with school accountability (Riley & Chester, 2012, 2015).  
 
During Phase I (2012-13), Riley and his team dismissed 160 teachers with unsatisfactory reviews 
and launched a campaign to attract teachers from Teach for America and successful charter 
schools. Phase I also included financial inducements to keep strong teachers in the district, such 
as the performance-based Teacher Leader Residency award. Riley also secured additional 
resources to improve student supports, including socio-emotional assistance for English Language 
Learners and special education students. During this phase, Riley built a central team to lead the 
Office of School Improvement and re-wrote huge swaths of the collective bargaining agreement 
(without negotiation). 
 
During Phase II (2013-2015), Riley developed centralized accountability systems and a process to 
tie school autonomy to school improvement. Even as authority devolved to individual schools, 
however, the centralized system of accountability - comprised of measures for school performance, 
teacher evaluation frameworks, and school performance plans reviewed and approved by the 
receiver – stayed in place. Riley thus empowered school leaders to make decisions for their schools 
while holding these leaders accountable for their choices through a centralized data collection and 
management system. 
 
During the third phase (current and ongoing), the state reviews progress against the school and 
district benchmarks set at the outset of the receivership. The outcomes of interest are closing the 
statewide achievement gap in ELA and math, improving graduation rates, and moving LPS into 
the top five “gateway city districts” in Massachusetts (from twenty-second of the twenty-four) in 
all three metrics over a several-year period. As schools reach these benchmarks, the receiver’s role 
is meant to shift from overseeing district operations to supporting and monitoring schools within 
the newly established accountability system. In May 2015, the state and the receivership renewed 
the strategic plan, noting LPS achievements to date. 
 
Results 




now identified as high performing, up from two in 2010 (Schuler et al., 2016). The LPS District 
Report (Riley & Chester, 2012, 2015) and Back from the Brink (2015) showed: 
 
• Increases in student growth percentiles on English and mathematics MCAS; 
• Increases in students’ absolute test scores - up 9 percentage points in English and 17 points 
in math; 
• Historic levels in math proficiency, with a 13 percentage point increase since 2012; 
• Increases in graduation rates from 52% in 2011, to 67% in 2015; and  
• A decline in dropout rates, from 9% in 2011 to 4.5% in 2014. 
  
These results are, by any account, remarkable. Coupling strong central leadership with principal-
level autonomy shows promise in Lawrence. It is early days yet, but other states and districts are 
watching: a year ago, the New York State Board of Regents asked the state education department 
to conduct research on the Massachusetts model and its success (Tan, 2015). As the debate 
continues about interventions that might help low-performing schools, the Lawrence receivership 
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